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Preliminary Notes
Introduction
This short essay originates from an international research context. 
Being part of a group investigating anti-corruption policies, I needed 
to present the most relevant Italian regulation on the matter to foreign 
colleagues, who were not familiar with our legal order. The structure 
of this paper responds to the two challenging tasks I had to face in 
that context: First, to sketch out the main features of the Italian legal 
order, impinging also on counter-corruption policies; second, to 
describe briefly, but clearly, the most recent and meaningful relevant 
Italian legislation. In the light of such aims, I decided to waive a general 
overview of the classical tools provided under the domestic penal law 
(as most of the legal orders provide for criminal offences, punishing 
bribery, embezzlement and similar corruptive misconduct); rather, I 
deemed it more useful to focus on a recent trend plainly inspired by 
corporate compliance, which is certainly more familiar to common-
law legal orders. 
Thus, the first part of this article is devoted to a very short 
introduction of the main features of the Italian criminal system. In 
fact, the corporate compliance program regulation is deeply related 
to it. The second part focuses on the importance of such compliance 
regulations as a means to contrast corruption: Special attention will 
be paid to how organizational patterns can be used as benchmarks in 
assessing quasi-criminal corporate liability, if employees commit one 
of the relevant offences. 
Some fundamental features of the Italian criminal system
To the extent required by the scope of this essay, the Italian 
criminal order can be described, firstly, as a German tradition system, 
strongly inspired - both at the constitutional and at the secondary 
levels – by a strict rule of law. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, 
along with the individual personal responsibility and the rehabilitation 
purpose of punishment are the fundamental principles underpinning 
the whole system, which is based on the following major statutory 
sources: The Italian Constitution (adopted in 1948, the most authentic 
fruit of the republican reform, after WWII); the European Convention 
of Human Rights (having, according to a recent constitutional court 
interpretation, an intermediate position, below the Constitution and 
above Parliament law); the 1930 Criminal Code and the 1988 Criminal 
procedural Code. Quite surprisingly, the latter introduced (in the late 
‘80s) an almost adversarial procedure, based on a strong distinction 
between the investigation (led by the prosecutor, with the help of the 
police), the preliminary hearing (judicial control on the prosecutor’s 
investigation and indictment) and the trial phase (public, adversarial, 
to gather pieces of evidence through cross examination: see art. 111 
Cost.). The traditional figure of the juge d’instruction was abandoned in 
favour of a more common-law inspired procedure. 
As for the judiciary, prosecutors and judges share the same 
status of “magistrates”. Magistrates’ duties and qualities are mostly 
established by the Constitution itself. They are recruited among law 
school graduates through a public selection. At the end of a very 
selective procedure the successful candidates should decide whether to 
be a prosecutor or a judge. Both judges and prosecutors are completely 
independent from the other branches of the State: The Government, 
in particular, has no way of controlling or influencing – directly or 
indirectly – magistrates, whether judges or prosecutors. They are all 
subject only to a unique superior power: The law (art. 101 co. 1 Cost). 
Thus, prosecutors do not have discretionary power in prosecuting 
an accused person (art. 112 Cost.): If, at the end of the investigation, 
the prosecutor holds elements against the suspect, the latter must be 
indicted. There is no room for pre-trial bargaining or prosecution 
agreements in lieu of indictment: The suspect must face trial. At the 
most, by waiving some procedural rights (e.g., the right to be judged 
only upon evidence gathered adversarially), the defendant will be able 
to bargain for a reduced sentence, if deemed liable. 
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Abstract
This paper offers a general overview on the Italian legislation regulating compliance programs. Even though the 
main relevant piece of legislation was adopted early, in 2001, after fifteen years its importance is becoming –– more 
and more patent. Although normative rules about compliance programs represent just a part of the Italian counter-
corruption policies, the structure provided under the 2001 Act (legislative decree no. 231), was extended also to 
public bodies and agencies that are not subject to that very same Act. Compliance programs were introduced beside 
the “quasi-criminal” liability of companies for their employees’ misconduct. The existence and the respect of a proper 
compliance program is the only viable defence for a company, if for example an act of bribery is perpetrated by an 
employee. What makes the Italian compliance programs regulation worth presentation is the particular relationship 
between corporations’ organizational duties, quasi-criminal liability and the Constitutional ban of any prosecutorial 
discretion (art. 112 It. Cost.). The outcomes of such synergy turn out to be peculiar, especially if compared to other 
realities, like the US federal one. 
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And some recent developments
In the light of the previous basic elements, readers will not be 
surprised to discover that in the Italian legal system (as in Germany [1], 
and in other European countries owing to a Roman Catholic tradition), 
societas delinquere non potest, thus, societas puniri non potest [2]. If 
punishment is aimed to rehabilitation, criminal liability can only be 
strictly individual and corporations cannot be subject to it. This does 
not mean that the Italian penal system does not punish misconduct 
related to (or originated in) corporate activity. On the contrary: The 
Italian criminal code has always been rich in provisions punishing 
corruptive misdeeds and the number of the offences has increased 
during past decades. Nonetheless, those offences cannot affect legal 
entities: As already stated, according to the Italian Constitution, only 
individuals can be charged and convicted for their personal behaviour 
(art. 27 Cost.), rejecting as a consequence all sorts of strict liability in 
criminal matters. However, corporations can take considerable unfair 
advantage of an individual’s misconduct, whose punishment will not 
wholly satisfy the public opinion’s expectations [3]. In fact, especially 
after the recent economic crisis, a stronger feeling of deception has 
grown in the public opinion: Corruption does not only divert public 
wealth form legal and proper purposes, but it boosts the disproportion 
between the rich and poor [4]. For this reason, in many European 
countries, a parallel system of regulatory sanctions has been introduced 
to sanction corporations for the illegal disadvantage taken from the 
offences perpetrated by their employees [2]. The whole European area 
has recently been experiencing a trend eroding the customary principle 
of societas delinquere non potest [5]. 
Actually, the tool for that erosion was corporate compliance. On 
the one hand, it was exported to the Old Continent by multinational 
companies, desiring to uniform their operative rules. On the other 
hand, compliance was established, in some countries, through legal 
instruments [6].
This is what has happened in Italy, where legislation was adopted 
in 2001 as a measure to implement the 1997 OECD convention 
against the corruption of foreign civil servants. The d.lgs. 231/2001 
(from now on, the 2001 Act) introduced the so called “corporations’ 
administrative liability” related to some specific offences perpetrated 
by their employees; beside the general establishment of such liability, 
the same decree also introduced a judicial procedure to asses it: That 
procedure is very similar to criminal trials. The competent jurisdiction 
is the criminal one, and the context of the “regulatory” assessment is 
the criminal proceeding itself, aimed to ascertain the perpetrator’s 
guilt. Thus, many Italian commentators affirmed that finally, societas 
puniri potest. 
For the aim of this paper, we will not linger on the quasi-criminal 
nature of the proceedings assessing corporate regulatory liability. 
Rather, we will focus on the relationship between compliance 
programs and companies’ (regulatory) roles in preventing corruptive 
crimes. Nonetheless, it is worth keeping in mind that such proceedings 
must respect all the constitutional principles cited above: The rules for 
adjudicating it have influenced, to some extent, the features of that 
liability itself. 
Analysis and Discussion of the Statutory Law
Companies’ role in preventing corruption: The legal pattern 
of the ‘omitted control’ 
Even though it is clear that no convergence has yet been found 
on the definition of such corporate liability (is it truly regulatory, 
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or criminal in disguise? Or rather civil?), there is agreement among 
Italian scholars as far as the rationale of the regulation is concerned: 
The purpose of the 2001 Act is to involve companies in the pro-active 
prevention of some criminal offences [7]. It is a clear example of the 
legal transplant of a well-established American trend [8]: Through 
compliance, national jurisdictions defer to the private sector the duty 
to prevent corruption [9]. Nonetheless, the control of this “privately 
devolved” function is tailored upon traditional criminal patterns [10]. 
In fact, most of the rules provided by the 2001 Act are directly 
inspired by the general theory of individuals’ criminal liability, 
both from the objective viewpoint (causational link between fact 
and offender), and the subjective one (mens rea); as stated, even the 
procedural rules somehow overlap with the individuals’ trial discipline.
The Act provides for some duties, the omission of which does not 
amount by itself to a crime (while the omission of the duties imposed, 
e.g., by the rules on occupational safety, does amount to a criminal 
offence); nevertheless, compliance to those duties is necessary to 
prevent regulatory liability under the 2001 Act. It must be clarified 
that the company can decide not to be compliant with the law: This 
behaviour will not amount to a criminal offence. But, if it is assessed 
that a corruptive fact has been committed within or on behalf of 
the company, the inconsistency will also determine the company’s 
regulatory liability. In such cases, no effective defence will help the 
company avoid regulatory liability, especially if the person convicted 
for the crime stands in a leading position within the company.
As already said, the rationale of this statutory choice is to involve 
corporations in counter-crime activity: They are asked to prevent 
some crimes by adopting a compliance model; the enumeration of 
those crimes is provided by the very same 2001 Act (art. 24, 25), and 
their number has increased constantly through the years. Companies 
endorse an autonomous guarantor role in the prevention of crime by 
the active involvement of the individuals holding leading positions 
within them. This pattern underpins a certain amount of independence 
between the role (and the liability) of the company and the role of the 
individual whose offences the company must prevent [11]. If a crime 
occurs, both the company (that did not prevent it) and the individual 
(who committed it) will be charged respectively in a regulatory and a 
criminal proceeding, which will eventually be reunited. However, it is 
worth noting that the regulatory proceeding against the corporation 
can be held even if the perpetrator cannot be personally identified; s/
he cannot be held criminally responsible; s/he died; and, to a certain 
extent, even if the criminal offence prosecution is time-barred (art. 8 
and 60). So far, the Italian model of compliance responds to a positive 
evolution of legal systems, along with the public opinion’s expectations: 
Corruption implies not only the gatekeepers’ penal liability, but also 
the whole collective organization’s responsibility [12]. 
Companies affected
As for the companies concerned, the 2001 Act relies on a general 
distinction between public bodies and private companies (art. 1).
Among the public entities, the Act affects neither the State, the 
Regions, the Provinces and the other public entities having a territorial 
standing, nor the public bodies having constitutional relevance (e.g. 
CSM, Consiglio superiore della Magistratura ) or public entities without 
economic relevance (e.g. tourist offices). Public entities with economic 
relevance (e.g. ENI, FINMECCANICA) are affected by the 2001 Act. 
In fact, it is possible to argue that these are very special companies: 
Even though they are part of the public system and subject to public 
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scheme of failure in preventing a relevant crime. The fault depends on 
the assessment of the company’s failure in preventing an employee’s 
criminal behaviour (both in a leading or in a subordinate position) 
acting on the company’s behalf or in its interest. The fault can be severe: 
as a result, harsh sanctions can be applied to the company. 
To avoid regulatory liability, companies are requested to adopt two 
tools (failing to adopt these tools the company will not be allowed to 
defend itself from the charge of failure in preventing the employees’ 
crime): 1) The adoption of an adequate compliance program; 2) The 
creation of a supervisory board, in charge of patrolling the application 
and the adequacy of the compliance program.
As for a compliance program, the 2001 Act refers to the 
management realm, that is to say that it does not interfere in regulating 
the individuals’ roles in the company (who does what?) but rather 
affects the plan of the organisation of each company’s activity: How 
must that activity be organised to achieve the desired purposes? 
With regard, for instance, to the prevention of bribery risks, a 
compliance program will set forth patterns of how to properly treat 
with public bodies and agencies. In the light of this purpose, the 
protocol will not impose any specific behaviour (e.g. to establish, among 
the employees, who is in charge of a specific activity); it will rather 
suggest the best way to act with regard to some particular activities, 
e.g. suggesting which is the most suitable category of employees with 
regard to a particular activity (in a bribery prevention framework, the 
employees who will deal with the police during a search should be 
individuals who have no commitment with direct payments, who have 
never undergone sanctions - not even disciplinary -, for facts related 
to bribery ). 
The compliance program should be able to guarantee respect 
of the law and to prevent crimes, or, at least, to convince the judge 
adjudicating the case that it is suited to such purpose [13]. When a 
crime is committed by an employee in a leading position, the company 
can be released from regulatory liability only if it proves that the 
employee intentionally disregarded the compliance program. It is, in 
fact, an indirect proof of the effectiveness of the compliance model: If 
the employee had not intentionally breached or ignored the compliance 
program, the latter would have prevented crime, demonstrating its 
efficiency. In fact, to be consistent to the 2001 Act, companies must 
consider that the adoption of the compliance program does not suffice: 
The model must be effectively applied.
The compliance program must be observed and respected by all the 
employees, all along the management chain. In other words, companies 
must be very careful in implementing the program. In fact, its adoption 
by itself only means that the company is aware of the risks of misconduct. 
Nonetheless, corporations will not fulfil their duty to comply with the 
2001 Act only by adopting a list of abstract precautionary rules [13]. 
What is relevant to avoid a regulatory conviction is the effectiveness 
of the program. Through a complete process of its implementation at 
each level of the organization, companies can demonstrate that the 
miscarriage was due to the employee’s intentional behaviour. 
The construction of a compliance program
Art. 6 of the 2001 Act establishes the essential elements of a 
compliance program. First and foremost, the article clearly excludes 
the viability of a general compliance model: the program must suit 
the specificity of each company. Letters a and b of art. 6 state that: the 
compliance program must assess in each company the risk areas for 
the commission of crimes; moreover, it must provide for protocols to 
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law rules, they are held in respect of the market criteria. As for private 
companies, the 2001 Act affects a very large number of these, regardless 
of legal personality. The only relevant criterion is that they must have an 
autonomous organisation, albeit embryonic. It must be said that, in the 
private sector, only individual enterprises are not touched by the 2001 
Act. In fact, in these cases, no distinction would be possible between the 
company and the individual in charge of it; thus, no distinction could 
be possible between regulatory and criminal liability because the same 
person would be punished both criminally and administratively, with a 
patent violation of the principle of substantive ne bis idem. 
However, two kinds of remarks must be made from the 
“subjective” point of view. On the one hand, it is worth noting that in 
Italy, as in many other European countries, the productive framework 
is mostly composed of medium-sized and small-sized enterprises. 
Unfortunately, according to the Italian regulation, the burden of the 
commitment to compliance is not tailored on the company’s size, but 
generally set for all the entities subject to it. The duty to comply with 
organizational models or programs under the 2001 Act can seriously 
affect the smallest of the Italian companies [9].
On the other hand, the Italian economic fabric (opposed to the 
productive one) is mostly dominated by the public sector. In the 
current years of “spoilt capitalism”, the entrepreneur faces the public 
administration rather than the market. Moreover such phenomenon 
was strengthened in recent years by the strong commitment of major 
entrepreneurs in politics [4]. As a result of law no. 190/2012, the 
majority of the public entities that were not affected by the 2001 Act 
has recently been subject to similar organizational duties [13]. 
‘Corruptive crimes’: A convergent view-point 
Many of the criminal offences that underpin companies’ regulatory 
liability correspond to a ‘corruptive scheme’. Originally, those offences 
were all listed in art. 24 and 25 of the 2001 Act and had in common the 
element of bribery. Later, many other offences were added to the list, 
which is now rather long and no longer homogeneous. Nevertheless, 
the original normative pattern is still very meaningful. In fact, in a 
recent document, the Italian Public Function Department stated that: 
“In the light of the recent law 190/2012 the concept of bribery must be 
largely intended. It affects any behaviour adopted by an administrative 
body that, in its ordinary activity, exploits its powers with the aim to 
receive a form of private, individual undue advantage”. Also actions 
that do not amount to one of the crimes punished under art. 218, 319 
and 319 ter of the Penal Code must in any case be considered to have 
corruptive relevance. Even though the Italian Supreme Court [14] has 
often ruled that the 2001 Act application is subject to strong respect 
of the rule of law, bribery is not only the conduct that amounts to 
one of the crimes foreseen by the Penal Code (Title II, Part I): Every 
hypothesis of mala gestio of the public functions, securing a private 
advantage, responds to the corruptive pattern.
In the light of these remarks, the rationale of the progressive en-
largement of behaviours relevant to the application of the 2001 Act is 
clear. A company’s regulatory liability can rise, not only with regard to 
behaviour amounting to a bribery, but also amounting to an ‘undue 
reception of public money’, ‘fraud to the State’ (see art. 24 l. 231/2001), 
‘public extortion’ and ‘induced bribery’ (art. 25). Generally speaking, 
(almost all) the actions causing individuals’ criminal liability can also 
cause the regulatory liability of the company which those very same 
individuals are part of. 
The compliance program
The pattern of a company’s regulatory liability is tailored upon the 
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guide the company’s decision in order to avoid and prevent crimes. 
Risk assessment is actually a basic activity. This is a pivotal aspect 
in the construction of a compliance program, underpinning strong 
familiarity with the history of the company, of its management and of 
its activity: All these points are fundamental in assessing the existence of 
a risk for the commission of crimes, relevant to the 2001 Act. So far the 
risk of criminal misbehaviour can hardly be distinguished from general 
economic and financial entrepreneurial risks [15]. Especially within 
big corporations this activity is tantamount to an enormous range of 
information, which is normally gathered through an ‘interview’. 
This is usually realised through several questionnaires, to be 
submitted to the different ranks of the company’s employees, in order 
to map out their specific activity and working tasks. The questionnaires 
must be targeted, first and foremost, on the general framework of 
the company’s activity and on the specific range of crimes that could 
affect that entrepreneurial area. For example, to prepare a compliance 
program for a company producing automotive spare parts, it will be 
necessary to first explore the particular management of the company 
and then to analyse its relationship with public authorities and 
agencies, in order to detect any ‘sensible areas’. This is the only means 
of identifying and assessing the effective impact of bribery commission 
risk and of pointing out the best solutions to prevent it. Business 
accounting and legal expertise are fundamental in detecting crimes that 
might be ‘hidden’ in the fabric of companies’ economic management. 
Especially with regard to counter-bribery policies, it is important that 
companies rely on practitioners’ expertise, in order to assess the real 
crime risks, also those hiding in practices and habits that would not 
appear relevant prima facie. 
Then, the program must assign an ‘incidence-score’ to the risk 
related to each possible crime. This can be a very complex task because 
it is practically based on prediction forecast of the advantages that the 
company could actually reap from the perpetration of that very same 
crime: For such a forecast an accurate reconstruction of the company’s 
history is necessary. 
On the basis of the ‘incidence-score’ a specific protocol should 
be realised in order to prevent possible crimes. To achieve maximum 
effectiveness protocols must comply with standing management 
organisation: It would be useless (or even dangerous, in the light of the 
2001 Act) to introduce protocols if you and your employees are totally 
unfamiliar with it. In fact, the more the program complies with the 
existing habits and practices, the higher the level of effectiveness that 
it will achieve.
With regard to counter-bribery policies, penal and general 
management experiences suggest keeping in mind some general but 
fundamental points. First of all, it is wise to devolve the protocol control 
on an employee who does not usually deal exclusively with public 
bodies and agencies. It is more convenient to entrust the supervision 
of the protocol implementation to a lower-ranking employee to deal 
with the Administration: This is a way of fostering the effectiveness of 
the control.
Furthermore, at least two persons should relate with the public 
administration. In this way no individual will hold autonomous power 
to spend money. It is also necessary to create a data base of all the 
events in which contact with the public administration occurred in 
order to make some information available: Who are the individuals that 
managed the relationship with the public administration? What was the 
reason for that relationship? How long was it and what were the results? 
Was there a litigation? How was it settled? 
Keeping these elements in mind, it is important to stress how 
different a compliance program must be, whether adopted for a 
company whose tasks are public procurements, or for a automotive 
body-shop company. Starting from a common core of matters (both 
entities are subject to public agencies’ control, for tax reasons, but 
also for occupational safety reasons), the risk assessment will differ 
considerably: Only the former company is constantly involved in 
economic links with the public administration, while the latter can 
be touched by it only occasionally. As a consequence, the compliance 
programs should be very different. 
The “supervisory board” (Organo di Vigilanza, O.d.V.)
A very relevant role in the implementation of the compliance 
program is played by the 2001 Act “supervisory board”. Actually, this 
body can be both individual or collegiate (the latter is more suitable, 
anyway). It is possible to affirm that the so called O.d.V. is a “genuine” 
Italian tool [16]. In fact, while the concept of compliance program 
as a machinery to prevent crime risks has patent anglo-american 
origins, the supervisory board, as provided for in art. 6 of the 2001 
Act, is quite peculiar, rather unique [17], having inspired other foreign 
legislations (see the Spanish Ley Organica 1/2015). The reason for such 
singularity is that, usually, the due diligence defence covers only lower 
employees’ misconducts: under the Italian 2001 Act, it may cover also 
the managerial liability. Thus, the need to introduce a new body, able to 
control – from above and independently – the senior management and 
the statutory auditors board [18]. So far, the Italian O.d.V. is neither 
a supervisory board under, e.g. the German Stock Corporation acts 
(having no relationship with the management board, except the duty 
to control it), nor a “compliance officer” or “department”. Even if the 
US Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO Chapter 8, 
§ B2.1) do not refer expressly to the compliance officer, they suggest a 
different pattern from the O.d.V. one. In the federal scheme, in fact, the 
governing authority and the high-level personnel share a trifold duty 
to implement the compliance and ethic program: however, they are all 
part of the corporate organization and they have a economic role in it. 
In fact, in a great number of legal orders, legal compliance is considered 
to be a duty of executive directors. But not in Italy. The O.d.V. was 
born as an hybrid body, being independent both from the governing 
authority and from the auditors board. Only after a recent statutory 
amendment (2011), under art. 6.4 bis of the 2001 Act it is possible to 
merge the functions of the O.d.V. with the ones of the auditors board. 
However, this option does not seem suitable, as different professionals 
are requested in the O.d.V., having not only management skills, but also 
solicitors, criminal lawyers, qualified accountants, occupational safety 
experts, as the specific task of the O.d.V. is to assess the effectiveness of 
the compliance program to prevent a large number of crimes.
In fact, from an independent standing-point [17] the O.d.V. has 
the trifold task to: a) assess compliance with the program; b) scrutinize 
effectiveness of the compliance program itself; c) take care of its 
progressive updating.
Under the first task the board should receive regular reports about 
the application of each single protocol of the program, from the em-
ployees entrusted to that duty; the board should also organise an audit-
ing activity, both scheduled and not scheduled, in order to be able to 
evaluate the model’s effectiveness. Under all the three tasks, the body 
must be able to operate proprio motu. 
Even if the idea of a truly independent supervisory board has 
a pivotal role in the effectiveness of the compliance program, under 
the 2001 Act very few statutory rules are dedicated to it. Unluckily, no 
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mention is made of its composition, nor of the link between the board 
itself and the company’s general management. 
Such relevant normative gaps were, by the way, filled by the praxis 
(through the practitioners usually in charge of preparing compliance 
programs: mostly solicitors and business accountants) and by the courts’ 
case-law. Unfortunately the Supreme Court tends to over-extend the 
duties of the board: According to the most recent case-law [14], the 
Court demands a high level of commitment from the supervisory board 
in the general management, it is to say in the adoption of discretionary 
evaluations and decisions [13]. However, the supervisory board does 
not hold such power/duty: It cannot/should not prevent the company 
from taking economic and managerial decisions, even if these may 
create criminal risks. This means that the board does not have a duty 
to prevent crimes: Its task is fully accomplished by supervising the 
implementation and the effectiveness of the program. It is worth noting 
that art. 40.2 of the Italian Criminal Code provides for a general model 
of “duty for preventing crimes”, by providing that «failing in preventing 
a fact that the individual has the legal duty to prevent, corresponds 
for that individual to perpetrate it». Such «legal duty» has never been 
expressly established on the O.d.V. members, neither by the 2001 Act 
nor by any following amendment. Nonetheless, as said above, the 
evolution of the most recent jurisprudence is not encouraging, almost 
recalling the case-law related to auditors boards (which are different 
and independent from the O.d.V.). In fact, since some years, the Italian 
Supreme Court started ruling that auditors have a duty to prevent crime 
under art. 40.2 ICC, even if such a legal duty is not expressly provided 
by the law. Such opinion, being strongly criticized by scholars, was 
recently applied also to the O.d.V. members, pretending that they have 
the duty to intervene on some aspects of the government policy, which 
should, conversely, be considered an exclusive discretionary power of 
the executive board. This jurisprudence sounds similar to the German 
BGH trend underpinning that the compliance officer has an indirect 
duty to prevent criminal facts, as Garantenstellung.
Concluding, on the one hand, such direct commitment of the 
O.d.V. in preventing crimes is not expressly provided by the law; on the 
other hand, it is undesirable: It would involve the “supervisory board” 
in managerial decisions, depriving it of its fundamental character of 
impartiality [13]. 
What next? The importance of training and of information
A fundamental aspect in the construction of a compliance model 
is represented by the training and by the information of all employees. 
Nonetheless, the 2001 Act does not provide for specific measures to 
disseminate the program. 
As the area of occupational security demonstrates, prevention 
is impossible without a strong commitment to a training protocol. 
Training is deemed unavoidable in preventing workers’ accidents. As 
for counter-corruption normative policies, information and training 
seem to assume more and more capital importance. Information has 
a very relevant role in assessing mens rea in regulatory proceedings. 
Even if informing people about corruption may seem very 
elementary, it is crucial for several reasons. First of all, information is 
useful to spread a common sensitivity for actions amounting to bribery 
(it is not possible to say that a common perception of the phenomenon 
does actually exist), according to the courts’ case-law. Second, it is 
important to give accurate information about the content of the 
protocols, which make up the compliance program.
Training and informing are fundamental activities, both from a 
general viewpoint (the legislator’s), and an individual viewpoint (the 
single company’s). With a decent basis of information and training, 
individuals are able to detect bribery-risky behaviour, even in those acts 
that are not usually perceived as relevant (e.g. the exercise of discretion 
in administrative activity). 
Thus, on the one hand, fostering training and information, even if 
not expressly provided under the 2001 Act, can assure the compliance 
program the prescribed effectiveness: This will help the judge in ruling 
positively on the company’s respect of it. Nonetheless, on the other 
hand, the more employees are informed and trained in singling out 
risky attitudes and behaviour, the easier the assessment of mens rea 
in the perpetration of the corruptive misconducts will be. Thus, as a 
paradox, the area of the companies’ liability could be enlarged as a 
result of the employees’ training and information [7].
Conclusions
Some concluding remarks
This short essay gives an example of one of the most important recent 
transplants from one legal family to another. As reported, company 
compliance, imported from the American (federal) legal order [3], was 
able to erode the historical European attitude to the matter of corporate 
liability for criminal acts. The current Italian legislation seems to be 
an interesting compromise between two different approaches: Without 
establishing a formal criminal liability for legal entities, the 2001 
Act provided for a comprehensive set of rules, finally filling a gap. 
Especially with regard to corruptive misconducts, a perpetrator can 
rarely be identified as a single person [19]; or, if identified, s/he often 
cannot be considered the real beneficiary of the results of the bribe. 
These fall back, instead, on the company as a whole [11]. In these cases, 
the tools of traditional penal law are unsatisfactory or insufficient: The 
regulatory liability established in d.lgs. 231/2001 covers that area of 
inconsistency, introducing severe requirements and harsh sanctions 
for non-compliant corporations.
At the moment, three interesting trends can be singled out. First, 
the transplant is very challenging: Fifteen years have elapsed since 
the entry into force of the 2001 Act, and the reactions of the Italian 
economic stakeholders are still limited. Companies are not yet used 
to the idea of a legal duty to adopt organizational patterns: They are 
still “getting ready” for it. Second, the transplant, though challenging, 
seems to be satisfactory as the model of the compliance program was 
somehow extended also to bodies that are not subject to the 2001 Act. 
Third, the Italian case-law about companies’ regulatory liability is still 
a “green fruit”. We can expect some very interesting rulings in the near 
future. Local courts and prosecution offices still need to “get used” to 
this recent, very peculiar, quasi-criminal proceeding: In a short period 
of time we will be able to read interesting judgments - the consequence 
of that transplant - and a new area for comparative analysis will be 
established. 
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